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Abstract 
According to theoretical models of valuing risky corporate securities, risk of default is 
primary component in overall yield spread. However, sizable empirical literature considers it 
otherwise by giving more importance to non-default risk factors. Current study empirically 
attempts to provide relative solution to this conundrum by presuming that problem lies in the 
subjective empirical treatment of default risk. By using post-hoc estimator approach of 
Lubotsky & Wittenberg (2006), we construct an efficient indicator for risk of default, by 
using sample of 252 US non-financial corporate data (2000-2010). On average, our results 
validate that almost 48% of change in yield spread is explained by default risk especially in 
recent financial crisis period (2007-2009). Hence, our results relatively suggest that potential 
problem lies in the ad-hoc measurement methods used in existing empirical literature. 
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1.   Introduction 
Recent financial crisis has led regulators to increase their attention towards controlling credit 
risk
1
 component of overall corporate structure of financial and non-financial institutions 
(Schuermann 2004). In addition, yield spread provides support in evaluating whether potential 
and existing investors are adequately compensated for the risk they are bearing or not, 
particularly in period of poorer economic outlook which in turn correlated with likelihood of 
lower-wealth situations invigorating reduce willingness to bear and hold risk by risk-averse 
investors in capital market.  
This aporia lead theoretical financial economists
2
 to devise efficient methods to 
adequately value risky nature of corporate securities. The way theoretical models price these 
corporate debt securities depend fundamentally upon their related credit risk. On the contrary, 
extensive empirical literature
3
 on the issue finds it practically arduous to accept this 
conjecture. The purpose of this paper is to attempt relatively to fill the gap by conjecturing 
that problem lies in ad-hoc measurement techniques employed by existing empirical 
literature. 
The main attribute of current empirical study is to efficiently minimize measurement 
errors caused due to ad-hoc treatment of default risk in existing empirical literature. By 
objectively considering risk of default as linear combination of significant proxy factors, 
current work through post-hoc estimator approach of Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) 
relatively provide solution to this problem. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Next section delineates briefly related 
literature and formulates default risk proxy factors. Section 3 outlines estimation methodology 
and data used. Empirical result analysis is presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 sums up 
the main findings and concludes current work. 
2.  Literature Review 
Extensive literature exists on the issue of explaining probable components of corporate bond 
yield spread. Historically, related literature divides them into two main categories; risk of 
default and residual risk premium attributing to non-default factors (Fisher 1959). But with 
the advent of option pricing method of Black and Scholes (1973), new horizon emerges to 
value risky corporate liabilities. Following Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974) gives 
contingent claim theory by evaluating credit risk of corporate debt as a function of call option 
on its equity securities. In his seminal work on pricing of risky corporate debt, Merton (1974) 
mainly focuses to incorporate corporate debt valuation process on the basis of risk of default 
and non-stochastic interest rate. Later, Black and Cox (1976), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), 
among others
4
, also treat risk of default as their primary pillar in deriving new valuation 
models incorporating and relaxing assumptions
5
 made by Merton (1974) to value corporate 
securities.  
                                                          
1
 We will use terms of credit risk, default risk and risk of default interchangeably in this paper.  
2
 Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), among others. 
3
 Elton et al. (2001), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Delianedis and Geske (2001), Huang & Huang (2003), Tsuji 
(2005), among others. 
4
 Chance (1990), Leland and Toft (1996), Duffie (1999), Longstaff et al. (2005), Ericsson and Renault (2006), 
Couderc et al. (2007), Liu et al. (2009). 
5
 Merton (1974) assumes firm will default only when they fully exhaust all their asset value and include constant 
interest rate in his valuation model. 
Despite immense efforts made by theoretical authors in treating risk of default as 
primary focus for valuing risky corporate securities, most empirical work do not confirm their 
premise to give key weight to default risk as the major component of yield spread. Elton et al. 
(2001), a pioneer empirical work in disentangling the determinants of corporate yield spread 
show that expected default loss (risk of default proxy) does not contribute to overall yield 
spread more than 25 percent. Among many others, Jones et al. (1984), Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001), Delianedis and Geske (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Tsuji (2005), Liu et al. 
(2009), also show that, in general, risk of default does not contribute majorly in explaining 
overall yield spread as compared to other non-default factors. 
Lack of consensus, between theoretical and empirical proponents, in treating risk of 
default as a major determinant in yield spread spur the question: Why risk of default is not 
being proven empirically as a major component in explaining yield spread?.  
We argue, in this paper, that one of the main concerns for investor is the risky nature of 
security for which they ought to be satisfied through the inclusion of default risk premium 
with other non-default related return, i.e. ‘greater the security’s risk of default, the greater its 
default premium should be’ (Sharpe et al. 1999: 447). Hence, we conjecture that this 
controversial issue of empirically lacking to accept risk of default as a major proponent of 
yield spread is mainly due to the measurement error induced by the usage of different nature 
of ad-hoc proxies in existing empirical literature. Therefore, we hypothesize that investor’s 
perception of risk of default is a function of more than ad-hoc proxies utilized in previous 
empirical work.  
To serve this purpose, we treat yield spread as a linear function of optimal explicit 
factors of default risk and control for the factors associated with overall macroeconomic and 
financial change. In other words, we focus on to build an optimal index for default risk on the 
basis of these proxies. This in turn enables to assist in solving the subjective treatment of 
default risk in overall US corporate bond yield spread. 
2.1   Default Risk Proxies 
By convention there is no standard definition of what constitutes a risk of default 
(Schuermann 2004). Most of the time in existing literature risk of default is being treated on 
ad-hoc basis. In order to streamline the optimal effect of default risk, we follow the Bank for 
International Settlements definition of default event (BIS, 2001: 30)6. In particular, what we 
are disposing here is that in order to simplify the conundrum of subjective treatment of default 
risk, we should treat risk of default as an optimal composite indicator of underlying explicit 
proxies, which leads to show relative true significance of default risk in overall formulation of 
yield spread. Bearing in mind the above discussion, we delineate explicit proxy factors of 
default risk (derived from BIS definition) alongside the control variables. 
2.1.1   Change in Distance to Default (∆DD) 
This proxy takes into consideration net worth of US corporates and volatility in its stock 
price. We calculate distance to default as a difference between natural logarithm of total assets 
and total liabilities divided by its monthly stock price volatility. It, ideally, represents the 
percentage change in overall long term default probability of the debt issuer (i.e. inability to 
fulfill its long term obligations). We expect an inverse relation between distance to default 
and the overall yield spread.   
2.1.2   Change in Z-score (∆Z) 
Z-score approach predicts corporate probability of default on short term basis by using firm-
specific performance ratios and plausibly caters financial health of the obligor past due 90 
                                                          
6 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2001. 
days or more on any of its credit obligation (Altman 1968). We presume that a positive 
percentage increase in Z-score expects to lower the corporate bond yield spread.   
2.1.3   Change in Credit ratings (∆lR) 
In similar vein, credit rating variations help to cater investors’ immediate decision in investing 
and financing activities. We include credit rating proxy because it presents rating agencies’ 
appraisal of risk of default associated with related corporate fixed income security issues. To 
represent credit rating changes, we use change in downgrade credit rating percentage because 
it is suitable to assess the impact of credit rating change on overall risk of default. In addition, 
increase in downgrade credit rating change will certainly impact positively on the overall 
change in yield spread for corporates’. 
2.1.4   Cash Flow volatility (CFv) 
On the other hand to evaluate firms’ position from cash flow perspective, we include 
fluctuations in operational cash flow situation of debt issuer to assess their ability to service 
outstanding debt as and when it becomes due. We expect a positive relationship between firm 
cash flow volatility and the risk-averse investor expected return from the risky corporate 
security. Following, Tang and Yan (2010), cash flow volatility is calculated as the coefficient 
of variation of operating cash flows by dividing monthly standard deviation to its absolute 
mean. In particular, we expect that this proxy will cater the true effect of firm’s ability to meet 
its financial obligation in real terms.  
2.2   Control variables 
In order to evaluate the true effect of change in default risk proxy factors on change in yield 
spread, we control for different proxy variables reflecting the US macroeconomic and 
financial market condition. Following Tsuji (2005), as volatility in economic activity leads to 
affect investors’ overall perception of required risk premium, we use change in Industrial 
Production Index rate (∆IPI)7 as a control proxy for change in business cycle (Collin-Dufresne 
et al 2001). Furthermore, to control for the effects of inflation level, we use change in 
Consumer Price Index (∆CPI).8 We expect a negative impact of change in inflation level on 
the explained variable (Merton 1974); this negative relationship is also confirmed by 
Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). 
On the other hand, to control for financial market indicators, we use change in Fed Fund 
Rate (∆FFR) to gauge the inter-bank market effect. In addition, we control for last month 
change in yield spread on its current month value (∆YSt-1) following Van Landschoot (2004). 
We expect a positive relation between these values. 
3.   Data and Methodology  
3.1   Data  
In order to measure optimal effect of risk of default on overall yield spread, monthly data on 
variable of interest (i.e. default risk proxies) and control variables, outlined in previous 
section, has been used for the period of 2000 to 2010. This period is suitable for the study as it 
cited occurrence of two recent financial crises (dot com and subprime crises) in the US 
economy. For control variables and corporate bond yield spread, entire data is collected from 
online source of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. On the other hand, for default risk proxy 
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 We also use change in GDP (∆GDP), instead of change in industrial production index (∆IPI) in order to 
evaluate robustness and statistical significance of default risk factors. 
8
 We also use change in producer price index (∆PPI) instead of change in consumer price index (∆CPI) for 
robustness. 
indicators we use Thomson Reuter database to calculate distance to default, cash flow 
volatility and z-score, individually, for 252 US non-financial corporates. In particular, using 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Bond Master service we came to include the sample of 
252 non-financial US corporates listed with plain vanilla bonds of medium and long term 
maturities (greater than one year till twenty years). In addition, downgrade percentage change 
in their credit ratings data is being collected from Standard & Poor’s research report 2011. 
Further, to collect stock prices (daily and monthly) for US corporate’s in order to 
calculate default risk proxy factors, we use Yahoo! Finance website. Additionally, in order to 
obtain average monthly time series of these explicit proxy factors we include simple weighted 
average across individual firms’.  
In addition, downgrade credit ratings data is available in annual frequency with US 
GDP data in quarterly frequency. We use cubic spline method to convert data into monthly 
frequency in order to make these time series in harmony with the rest of data variables. Since, 
our data follow time series we checked whether it has a unit root or not. Following 
Phillips-Perron test of unit root (1988), it is observed that almost all of the time series were 
stationary integrated with zero order. In order to condense the effect of cubic spline algorithm 
we, in our preliminary model, use natural logarithmic form of change in downgrade credit 
ratings variable and natural logarithmic form of change in GDP control variable. Further, for 
monthly yield spread data, we use US treasury monthly yield data (averaged on 1, 2, 5, 10 and 
20 years) and US corporate bond monthly yield data (averaged on investment and non-
investment grades of similar maturity) from the online source of Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. Finally, this gives us total of 132 monthly observations of the focused time series data. 
3.2   Methodology  
Following our premise of objective treatment of default risk, we follow “post-hoc” estimator 
approach of Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006). Using multiple regressions (least square) of 
explanatory proxy variables on dependent variable, Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) use 
regression coefficients of each explanatory proxy to compute a weighted average index, 
showing true effects of variable of interest. By assuming risk of default as our focused 
variable, we aim to evaluate the optimal effect of explicit default risk proxy factors on change 
in the relative yield spread while controlling for macroeconomic and financial market 
variables. 
Since, weights used here are ratio of covariances of dependent variable (∆YS) and 
statistically significant default risk proxy variables to the covariance between the most 
significant proxy variable
9
 and dependent variable, this technique helps in optimally 
minimizing variance of errors terms of these proxy variables that leads to construct our 
required composite indicator. Thus, it enables us to reduce noise or measurement error 
caused, in the existing empirical literature, due to using biased coefficients of ad-hoc proxies 
treated as the risk of default.  
Hence, we use this statistic as an optimal indicator reflecting the true effect of risk of 
default by utilizing previously explained proxies simultaneously through multiple regressions. 
Therefore, we first evaluate, individually, effects of our default risk proxy factors on change 
in yield spread and then following our principal objective, evaluate linearly effect of our 
default risk proxy factors, aggregately, on change in overall yield spread. 
This can be manifested as; 
                                                                                                                        (1) 
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 We follow Akaike information criteria (AIC) to select the principal proxy factor. 
Whereas, ( ) represents constant term, (   ) represents matrix (vector) of monthly 
change in default risk factor time series (t-1 to t), (   ) represents matrix (vector) of change 
in control variable time series from month t-1 to month t, (α) is a coefficient matrix (scalar) of 
our explanatory proxy variables, ( ) is a coefficient matrix (scalar) of control variables, (  ) 
shows error term following i.i.d, and (    ) represents change in overall yield spread (i.e. 
difference between US corporate bond yield—non financial and US treasury yield, on 
average, month t-1 to month t of similar maturity). 
We can describe the final form of our model as;
10
 
                                                                               (2) 
Whereas, (θ) represents constant term, (∆) shows monthly percentage change from 
month t-1 to month t, (α) represents coefficients of explanatory proxy variables, ( ) shows 
control variables coefficients,(  ) is a disturbance term following i.i.d and (    ) represents 
change in overall yield spread. 
Following, Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006), we treat risk of default as a composite 
explanatory variable which is not been optimally measured in existing empirical literature. 
Thus it is being represented by an optimal mix of significant proxy factors. Stated differently, 
to show the optimal effect of risk of default factor on change in yield spread of non-financial 
US corporate securities, we use the post-hoc estimator approach.  
In addition, our presumption delineates the objective treatment of risk of default based 
on proxy factors derived from BIS definition of default event. On the basis of equation (2), we 
include those proxy variables which are statistically significant in order to construct our 
representative indicator for risk of default. 
    
             
             
   
 
   
                                                                                                   (3)
11
 
In equation (3), (ρt) shows our post-hoc estimator for the risk of default indicator in 
month t. Further, (Yt) represents our dependent variable (change in yield spread—ΔYS) in 
month t, and (Xjt) represents our statistically significant proxy factors j in month t, whereas 
(βj) represents the least square regression coefficient of significant (j) explanatory variables at 
time t (months). Further (X1t) presents principal statistically significant explanatory variable
12
 
on which the post-hoc estimator is constructed.  
Equation (3) gives us the optimal proxy indicator for default risk by minimizing 
measurement errors in order to evaluate its true effect on the overall yield spread formulation 
for risky corporate securities. To assess this effect, we regress US corporate bond yield spread 
on our post-hoc risk of default estimator. 
                                                                                                                          (4) 
In equation (4), (    ) represents difference between US corporate bond yield 
(investment and non-investment grade) and the US treasury yield, on average, in month t. (ρt) 
represents the default risk post-hoc estimator in month t, whereas (λ) shows the regression 
coefficient of our default risk estimator and (  ) represents i.i.d error term. Δ represents the 
monthly percentage change in variables (from month t-1 to month t). Further, ( ) shows the 
constant term in equation (4). In order to evaluate robustness of our default risk optimal 
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 Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) empirical model. 
11
 Detail derivation can be found in Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006). 
12
 We follow Akaike information criteria (AIC) to select the principal factor as X1t. 
indicator, we take into consideration its effect on overall yield spread during recent US 
financial crisis (July 2007 to March 2009). We divide our sample time interval into crisis and 
non-crisis period and analyze our explanatory variable effect on dependent variable.
13
 For this 
we introduce dummy variable into specification (4) and our estimated model becomes; 
                                                                                                                (5) 
In equation (5),              reports change in default risk post-hoc during financial crisis 
and                  shows change in default risk post-hoc during non-crisis period. 
Specification (5) mainly explains how change in our risk of default indicator affects 
change in overall yield spread during crisis and non-crisis period. We use interaction term of 
our focused estimator with the crisis and non-crisis dummy variable in order to effectively 
gauge the behavior of our explanatory variable on dependent variable during the crisis period. 
Next section delineates and analyzes the econometric results and limitations of specifications 
introduced in this section. 
4.   Empirical Analysis 
Our preliminary objective is to study monthly percentage change of the default risk 
explanatory proxies on our dependent variable (i.e. change in yield spread), therefore, focused 
time series become stationary integrated with order zero after taking percentage change 
effect.
14
 
Since our explanatory proxy variable time series are stationary, we follow ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression for the econometric estimation. Table (1), column (1) shows the 
result of introducing cash flow volatility as a risk of default proxy to explain changes in yield 
spread (while controlling for macroeconomic and financial market factors). In column (1), the 
operational cash flow volatility (CFv) of non-financial US firms significantly affect change in 
relative yield spread following presumed relation as delineates in section 2.1.4. 
In particular, if we glance on overall results in all columns of table (1), then it is evident 
that all our explanatory proxy variables follow expected relationship with our dependent 
variable. Furthermore, in column (2), (3) and (4) we evaluate, individually, the effects of 
change in distance to default (∆DD), change in Z-score (∆Z) and change in downward grade 
credit rating (∆lR) on our explained variable (∆YS). We find that (∆DD) affects positively 
and (∆lR) affects negatively our dependent variable (∆YS) at 1% significant level, 
respectively. In addition, (∆Z) although shows expected relation with dependent variable is 
not significant. On the other hand, if we look at our control variables in column (1) to (4), we 
find that change in inter-bank interest rate and change in previous period yield spread (month 
t-1) significantly affects change in current period yield spread (month t) following presumed 
relation (as explained in section 2.2). 
Table (1), column (5), report results of our specification (2), which delineates the linear 
effect of change in default risk proxy factors on change in overall yield spread, while catering 
the effects of control variables. After reviewing the results of first four columns of table (1), 
we may be factual to validate our conjecture of treating risk of default as a linear combination 
of these proxy factors as their explanatory power significantly enhances to (37%) in 
rationalizing overall variation in US corporate bond yield spreads. 
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 We deeply thank anonymous reporter comments regarding taking into consideration recent US financial crisis 
disruptions in our analysis.   
14
 We use Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philips Perron tests of stationarity to check the presence of unit roots. 
All our time series are stationary integrated with order zero i.e. I (0). 
Following the first four columns, we evaluate the results of our main model (column 5, 
table 1). In column (5), we discover that cash flow volatility (CFv), change in distance to 
default (∆DD) and change in downgrade credit rating (∆lR) remains statistically significant. 
On the contrary, change in Z-score (∆Z) although reports presumed relation with change in 
yield spread (∆YS) remains statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 1: Influence of change in risk of default proxy factors on US Corporate bond yield spread change (∆YSt) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
CFv 0.74c    1.51c 1.30c 
 (0.37)    (0.92) (0.79) 
∆DD  -0.15a   -0.15a -0.17a 
  (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03) 
∆Z   -0.07  -0.04 -0.02 
   (0.05)  (0.03) (0.03) 
∆lR    0.90b 1.17a 1.21a 
    (0.45) (0.42) (0.49) 
∆ CPI -0.15 -1.97 -0.63 -1.89 -4.65b  
 (2.02) (1.92) (1.99) (2.21) (2.09)  
∆ IPI -0.09 -0.43 -0.31 -0.01 -0.65  
 (1.02) (0.95) (1.01) (1.00) (0.92)  
∆FFR -3.24a -2.55a -3.18a -3.22a -2.54a -2.62b 
 (0.56) (0.54) (0.55) (0.55) (0.52) (1.56) 
 ∆YSt-1 1.47
a 1.24a 1.62a 1.57a 1.34a 1.25b 
  (0.55) (0.51) (0.54) (0.54) (0.50) (0.53) 
∆PPI      -1.82a 
      (0.61) 
∆lGDP      -1.79 
      (1.20) 
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 
R² Adjusted 0.22 0.2 0.15 0.24 0.37 0.30 
D-W 1.79 1.91 1.88 1.83 1.99 1.97 
LM- Statistics (B-G test)     15.50 16.97 
P-value (B-G test)     0.21 0.15 
Note: (CFv) Cash Flow volatility, (∆DD) change in Distance to Default, (∆Z) change in Z-score, (∆lR) change 
in Credit Ratings, (∆CPI) change in Consumer Price Index, (∆IPI) change in Industrial Production Index rate, 
(∆FFR) change in Fed fund Rate, (∆YSt-1) change in previous period Yield Spread, (∆PPI) change in Producer 
Price Index, (∆lGDP) change in GDP. Standard errors are reported in brackets. a, b & c represent significance 
level at 1%, 5% & 10% respectively. 
 
Thus, results in column (5) table (1), describe significant long term effect of default risk 
proxy factors on the dependent variable. In general, one percent increase in distance to default 
for US non financial firms (i.e. showing that a firm is moving away from the level of default) 
reduces related yield spread percentage by almost 0.15 units. Further, a one percentage point 
increase in operational cash flow volatility increases vulnerability of technical insolvency of 
US non-financial firms and hence raises their respective yield spread by almost 1.51units. In 
similar vein, a percentage increase in downgrade credit rating increases the overall yield 
spread by almost 1.2 units, validating presence of risk-averse investors in capital market. 
On the other hand, with the linear introduction of default risk proxy factors, we find that 
change in inflation (∆CPI) becomes statistically significant. Whereas, change in interest rate 
(∆FFR) effect and change in last month yield spread (∆YSt-1) remains statistically significant, 
respectively.
15 
In particular, our results confirm the relationship between inflation and interest 
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 As constant term (θ) is statistically insignificant with minimal regression coefficient, we drop related results. 
rate on overall yield spread put forward by theoretical strand of related literature. 
Furthermore, Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test (B-G test) suggests that we cannot 
reject null hypothesis of no serial correlation in residual error terms (i.e. p-value of 0.21). 
Column (6), table (1), for robustness, show the results which are not significantly 
different from results of column (5).
16
 In addition, B-G test for column (6) also reports no 
evidence of significant serial correlation in our residual error terms. 
On the other hand, we did not find any significant correlation between default risk 
proxy factors that indicate presence of any multicollinearity problem. Furthermore, 
correlations between these proxy variables follow, in general, their expected signs. But in 
order to be certain that results reported in table (1) are not exacerbated by this problem, we 
also follow the variance decomposition proportions method of detecting significant 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables (Belsley et al. 1980) and the variance 
inflation factor (VIF). From the analysis of correlation matrix, variance decomposition 
proposition method and VIF indicator, we deduce that our proxy factors of default risk do not 
possess the problem of significant multicollinearity which leads us to evaluate the results of 
our specification (3), (4) and (5) respectively.
17
  
Following specification (3), from table (1) column (5), we took only those proxy factors 
which show statistically significant relation and construct a monthly time series of change in 
default risk factor delineating the optimal mix effect of statistically significant proxies. In 
particular, we select
18 
distance to default as our principal proxy factor (X1t in specification 3) 
representing optimal default risk indicator. 
Figure 1; graphically depict change in default risk post-hoc indicator time series (   ) 
along with change in yield spread (∆YS) of US corporate bonds for period of 2000-2010.  It 
shows that our risk of default estimator almost systematically depicts a structural relation with 
overall yield spread of non-financial US corporate bond securities, showing similar long term 
trend. Further, our variable of interest (   ) quite effectively gauge the dot-com (2000-2002) 
and sub-prime (2007-2009) crises, reporting more than 320 basis points change in the overall 
risk of default during sub-prime crisis and almost 200 basis points increase in the overall risk 
of default for US Corporate bond issues in dot-com crisis. 
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 We replace control variables, further, we also introduce, simultaneously, change in stock market return (∆SP), 
S&P500, and change in its volatility index (∆VIX) in our focused model, but results did not significantly varies.  
17
 Related results could be provided upon request. 
18
 On the basis of Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
Figure 1: Default risk post-hoc estimators (    ) and yield spread of 
US corporate bond securities (∆YS) 
 
Table (2), column (1) show the results of our specification (4), which is the focused 
objective of this study i.e. evaluating the effect of optimal risk of default estimator on overall 
yield spread of US corporate bonds. 
Column (1) table (2), shows that our post-hoc default risk estimator is statistically 
significant in explaining variations in US corporate bond yield spread. In particular, 
regression coefficient indicates that due to one percentage positive change in default risk 
estimator (i.e. as it is based on distance to default principal proxy factor, therefore it means 
firm is moving away from default level) the respective yield spread reduces by (0.62) units. In 
addition, explanatory power of our risk of default indicator is (41%) which relatively supports 
theoretical model assumptions in treating risk of default as a primary component in valuing 
risky corporate securities.
19
 Furthermore, significant constant term in specification (4) shows 
presence of non-default factors in overall formulation of corporate bond yield spread. On the 
other hand B-G test show no evidence of serial correlation in residual error terms. In addition, 
through Ramsey Reset test, we validate the evidence of delineating specifications based on 
our surmise of objectively treating default risk as linear combination of significant proxy 
variables.
20
 In turn, these results support existing empirical literature of linear relationship 
between focused dependent and explanatory variables. 
 
Table 2: Default risk post-hoc estimator effect on US corporate bond yield  spread 
Dependent variable is yield spread change (     ) 1 2 
     -0.62
c  
 (0.33)  
              -1.22
a 
  (0.46) 
                  -0.50 
  (0.71) 
  0.04c 0.64b 
  (0.02) (0.33) 
Observations 132 132 
R² Adjusted 0.41 0.48 
D-W 1.99 2.05 
LM-Statistics (B-G) 5.90 1.94 
P-value (B-G) 0.93 0.37 
F-statistics (Ramsey Reset Test) 0.06 0.76 
P-value (Ramsey Reset Test) 0.93 0.46 
Note: [    ] change in default risk post-hoc, [             ] change in default risk post-hoc during financial crisis, 
[                ] change in default risk post-hoc during non-crisis period. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets. a, b & c represents significance level at 1%, 5% & 10% respectively. 
In addition, table (2) column (2) report results of specification (5) which delineates the 
effect of financial system disruptions in the US due to sub-prime crisis (2007-2009). In 
particular, results in column (2) outline how significantly our focused optimal indicator of 
default risk affects yield spread variations in this crisis period. It is really interesting to note 
that by bifurcating our focused time interval into crisis and non-crisis period, our risk of 
default estimator shows engaging effect on overall fluctuation in yield spread. It now manifest 
that statistically significant relation in column (1) is mainly due to the effects of financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. Table (3) column (2) shows that our default risk estimator is statistically 
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 Supporting Churm & Panigirtzoglou (2005) and Tang & Yan (2010). 
20
 Here, p-value is more than 5%, so we can not reject null hypothesis of correct linear model specification. 
significant during sub-prime crisis period in explaining variations in US corporate bond yield 
spread. 
On the contrary, during normal (i.e. non-crisis) period it is not statistically significant 
though following presumed relation with our dependent variable. In addition, significance 
level of our constant term, table (2) column (2), has increased emphasizing the importance of 
presence of non-default risk factors in overall formulation of US corporate bond yield spread 
in this crisis period.
21
 Further, explanatory power of our post-hoc estimator increased by 7 
percent (i.e. to 48%), indicating robust effects in explaining abrupt variations in overall yield 
spread in sub-prime crisis period. In similar vein, results of Breusch Godfrey LM test of serial 
correlation for residual error term shows no evidence of significant serial correlation. In 
general, by comparing results in column (1) and (2), table (2), we draw potential outcome that 
our post-hoc estimator mainly gauge significant relation on overall yield spread in the sub-
prime crisis period and its effect dilates across non-crisis period on aggregate basis. This in 
turn relatively supports theoretical strand of related literature in treating default risk as a 
primary pillar in the valuation of risky corporate securities.
22 
 
5.   Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to explore the treatment of default risk conundrum between 
theoretical and empirical proponents of valuing risky corporate debt securities. The dominant 
view exists in theoretical literature is that risk of default is fundamental to value risky 
corporate securities which is evident in structural models of valuing credit spread. Whereas 
major empirical literature on the issue shows that non-default risk factors are more important 
in valuing these risky corporate securities. Current study attempts to fill this void by 
presuming that problem to this debate lies in the measurement techniques existing empirical 
literature use as a subjective treatment of default risk. Using risk of default as an objective 
linear function of significant proxy factors, we construct an optimal indicator (following 
Lubotsky and Wittenberg 2006) for default risk which contributes relatively to solve this 
debate. Our risk of default estimator significantly explains the change in US corporate bond 
yield spread during recent financial crisis (2007-2009). In particular, it explain about (48%) 
change in overall yield spread model, indicating dominance of theoretical
23
 school of thought 
in treating default risk as a cornerstone in risky corporate debt valuation process. Further, it 
will be interesting to include sample from other developed markets (such as European Union) 
and from emerging markets to validate robustness of our results. 
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